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The grand challenges that humanity faces—poverty, inequality, hunger, conflict, 
climate change, deforestation, pandemic, among others—hinder the progress of sustainable 
development. These issues can be addressed only by fundamental changes in behavior, as 
well as in the modes and processes of production and of business more generally. In this 
paper we will develop the concept of responsible innovation and discuss the potential and 
limitations of various models of corporate governance with regard to responsible innovation. 
Our analysis imports from the political sciences theoretical and empirical insights into how 
alternative forms of participative and reflexive governance can help address the social and 
environmental challenges that society faces. The paper thereby offers examples of innovative 
corporate governance that can help to generate innovations that do good and avoid harm. We 
also illustrate the governance challenges and the role of responsible innovation in the advent 
of the new coronavirus pandemic (COVID-19). 
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Humanity is facing a number of grand challenges threatening a sustainable future for 
our planet (Ferraro, Etzion, & Gehman, 2015; George, Howard-Grenville, Joshi, & Tihanyi, 
2016). Currently there seem to be no adequate responses to deal with these major 
challenges—poverty, inequality, hunger, access to water, violent conflicts, deforestation, 
ocean acidification, climate change, biodiversity loss, and infectious diseases or pandemics—
all of which appear to be escalating (Griggs et al., 2013; Whiteman, Walker, & Perego, 2013). 
Worryingly, some experts claim that certain critical thresholds have already been crossed and 
the earth’s life-support system is in peril (Rockström et al., 2009). In view of these 
challenges, there are urgent calls for concerted efforts to reduce the concomitant 
repercussions on world peace, health, stability, and prosperity (George et al., 2016).  
The United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), international organizations, and 
individual countries are seeking ways to deal with these grand challenges (Waddock, 2008). 
Many of these initiatives—a prominent example is the United Nations Global Compact 
(UNGC)—aim to involve businesses as active participants and to encourage collaboration of 
businesses with public and civil society actors to foster sustainable development (Rasche, 
Waddock, & MacIntosh, 2013; Voegtlin & Pless, 2014). However, despite the frequent pleas 
for corporate contributions to sustainable development (Marcus & Fremeth, 2009) and the 
acknowledgment of increased corporate responsibilities (Matten & Crane, 2005; Scherer & 
Palazzo, 2007), the role of business firms is still ambivalent (Scherer, Palazzo, & Matten, 
2009).  
On one hand, businesses do take responsibility; they provide sustainable products and 
services, engage in corporate social responsibility (CSR) or sustainability initiatives and 
produce public goods (Kaul, Conceicao, Le Goulven, & Mendoza, 2003; Matten & Crane, 
2005). On the other hand, their contributions are often more symbolic than substantial 
(Laufer, 2003; Sethi & Schepers, 2013). Even worse, business firms are frequently pivotal 
actors in contributing to social misery and environmental disasters (Banerjee, 2007; Fleming 
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& Jones, 2013; with regard to recent scandals see Eberl, Geiger, & Aßländer, 2015; Rhodes, 
2016; Schembera & Scherer, 2017). This suggests that there is something wrong in the 
internal decision-making and incentive structures of businesses—that is, in their corporate 
governance structures and in the way they implement these structures to meet societal 
challenges (see, e.g., Bazerman & Tenbrunsel, 2011; Greve, Palmer, & Pozner, 2010; 
Scherer, Baumann-Pauly, & Schneider, 2013).  
Thus, the purpose of this conceptual paper is to analyze the role of the corporation and 
its corporate governance in contributing to responsible innovation. We will argue as follows. 
First, we will propose that responsible innovation is an inherently normative concept that can 
be defined on the basis of three norms: Avoid harm, do good, and coordinate with others for 
the sake of protecting the people and the planet (Owen et al., 2013; Voegtlin & Scherer, 2017; 
von Schomberg, 2011). We argue that without responsible innovation, it is impossible to meet 
the grand challenges and to achieve sustainable development (Adams, Jeanrenaud, Bessard, 
Denyer, & Overy, 2016; Grinbaum & Groves, 2013).  
Second, we will suggest that corporate governance can help steer business toward 
innovations that avoid harm and do good. We will discuss legitimacy, effectiveness, and 
efficiency as criteria with which corporate governance models can be explored with regard to 
their contributions to responsible innovation and, ultimately, sustainable development. Third, 
we will argue that participative and reflexive structures are useful mechanisms for addressing 
the potential contributions and limitations of governance models in general and of current 
models of corporate governance in particular. With regard to the former we will briefly 
discuss the governance challenges in the advent of the new coronavirus pandemic (COVID-
19). With regard to the later we will illustrate how these structures can introduce novel 
elements to corporate governance and, thus, enable businesses to create innovations that 
contribute to sustainable development (Driver & Thompson, 2002; Dryzek & Pickering, 
2017; Gomez & Korine, 2008; Scherer, Baumann-Pauly, & Schneider, 2013). 
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SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, GRAND CHALLENGES, AND RESPONSIBLE 
INNOVATION 
Sustainable development can be defined as “development that meets the needs of the 
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” 
(United Nations, 1987). Contemporary conceptions of sustainable development advance three 
principles: environmental integrity, social equity, and economic prosperity (Bansal, 2005; 
Marcus & Fremeth, 2009; Scherer, Palazzo, & Seidl, 2013). Whether or how these principles 
can be met is a matter of debate in which the proposed solutions range from small adjustments 
to massive social transformations of the current institutional and economic order (Hopwood, 
Mellor, & O’Brien, 2005). 
Grand challenges is the term used to describe massive social and environmental 
challenges that transcend borders and have (potential or actual) negative effects on large 
numbers of people (Ferraro et al., 2015; George et al., 2016). Notable examples are global 
warming, ocean acidification, poverty, and inequality. These challenges are complex, and 
there are no ready-made solutions. These grand challenges have become a matter of concern 
not only for intergovernmental actors, such the United Nations (2015), the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2011, 2012), and the European 
Commission (2008; see also Cagnin, Amanatidou, & Keenan, 2012), and for individual 
countries (see, e.g., Grand Challenges Canada, 2011), but also for private actors, such as 
business firms and industry associations, and for civil society actors, such as 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) (Ferraro et al., 2015; George et al., 2016; Nilsson, 
2017).  
Responsible innovation was originally used as a concept in the context of risk 
assessments of scientific innovations, especially in nanoscience and nanotechnology research, 
but was also applied to issues concerning research with human subjects, socio-technical 
integration, intellectual property, and the ethical and social implications of scientific 
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innovation in general (Owen et al., 2013). Responsible innovation has been defined as “a 
transparent, interactive process by which societal actors and innovators become mutually 
responsive to each other with a view on the (ethical) acceptability, sustainability and societal 
desirability of the innovation process and its marketable products” (von Schomberg, 2011, p. 
50). Building on this understanding, we argue that responsible innovation should meet three 
types of responsibility (Voegtlin & Scherer, 2017): (1) the responsibility to do no harm 
(Deschamps, 2012; Lee & Petts, 2013), (2) the responsibility to do good (Stahl & Sully de 
Luque, 2014), and (3) responsible governance1 (Jordan, 2008; Scherer & Palazzo, 2011), 
which involves establishing institutions, structures, and procedures on multiple levels in order 
to facilitate innovations that fulfill (1) and (2). Governance is thus a meta-responsibility and 
key to achieving responsible innovation (Voegtlin & Scherer, 2017). 
This understanding differs from social innovation in management research, which is 
defined as “innovative activities and services that are motivated by the goal of meeting a 
social need and that are predominantly diffused through organizations whose primary 
purposes are social” (Mulgan, 2006, p. 146). The understanding of responsible innovation is 
broader, as it considers all kinds of public, private, and civil society actors and types of 
collaborations between these as possible innovators, not just particular types of organizations. 
Furthermore, responsible innovation is distinct, as innovations are subjected to a deliberative 
control process. Specifically, responsible governance requires governance structures at 
various levels (e.g., global, societal, corporate) that facilitate an inclusive process of collective 
will formation on the goals and means and the societal acceptability of innovations (Stilgoe, 
Owen, & Macnaghten, 2013; Voegtlin & Scherer, 2017). This also helps society to consider 
how the trade-offs between conflicting collective goals (e.g. potential trade-offs between 
                                                        
1 Voegtlin and Scherer (2017) used the term governance responsibility to refer to this aspect of responsible 




efficiency, stability, and justice or public health) should be managed and to determine what 
levels of risk or harm should be accepted when regulating financial markets (Marti & Scherer, 
2016) or restricting economic and social exchange during a pandemic such as the current 
COVID-19 (Fottrell, 2020; Portes, 2020). In contrast, social innovation is created and diffused 
paternalistically by organizations with prosocial motivations that do not necessarily include 
those in need in their decision-making process or governance structures. 
Pertinent examples of responsible innovation can be found in new information and 
communication technologies (ICT). These technologies have great potential to contribute to 
sustainable development and to address grand challenges. At the same time, companies and 
public authorities that develop and implement ICT innovations need to be aware of the 
potential harmful consequences (Zuboff, 2015).  
One area where ICT innovations can contribute to mitigating grand challenges is the 
use of ICT in caring for elderly people (Stahl, 2018). The aging population is one of the grand 
challenges, becoming manifest for instance in the challenge of how to take care of a growing 
elderly population with fewer and fewer younger people. In this regard, ICT may for instance 
be used to help to overcome loneliness or monitor the use of drugs. At the same time, it may 
increase feelings of loneliness if the technology replaces personal contact (Stahl, 2018). 
Evonods is a company that developed an automatic medicine dispensing service for persons 
with chronic conditions or dementia. The service “guides the client to take the right dose of 
medication at the right time, which considerably improves the client’s well-being and sense of 
independence” (Responsible Industry Consortium, 2018, p. 5). This is an innovation that aims 
to do good.  
 Furthermore, ICT can be used to track the movements of individuals and their social 
relationships during a pandemic to control the spread of the disease. Again, this is an 
innovation that has potential positive public health implications, especially in a crisis, as is the 
case with the current COVID-19 pandemic. Yet, the collection of personal data and the 
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tracking of individuals undermines individual liberties and may be abused by business actors 
or public authorities when applied outside the narrow realm of combating an infectious 
disease (Fussell, 2020). 
Obviously, innovations based on ICT touch on sensitive areas with regard to societal 
expectations and individual rights. There are aspects that can be perceived as harmful, such as 
the potential violation of privacy rights and the rights to freedom of movement and self-
determination (Richards, 2013). Restrictions of individual rights can only be justified when 
they are based on legal rules (e.g. when the law mandates such restrictions during an 
epidemic) and determined in a process of democratic governance, where the benefits and 
harms of such measures are weighed against each other and all interests and no other less 
intrusive measures are available. It also touches on questions of fairness and equal access to 
the benefits of technology and public health care (Responsible Industry Consortium, 2018) 
and to the process of collective will formation in general (Habermas, 1998).  
In this regard, corporate governance should facilitate a process that allows the 
company to develop the innovation while taking societal needs and fears into consideration, 
thereby increasing its potential for doing good and decreasing its potential for causing harm, 
and thus, ultimately, enabling a contribution to sustainable development. In the case of 
Evonods, the company included stakeholders early on in the innovation process and continued 
the dialogue throughout to ensure societal acceptability (Responsible Industry Consortium, 
2018). In the case of tracking smartphone data to fight the COVID-19 pandemic, network 
providers in some democratic states have started to cooperate with public authorities to 
provide only anonymized data that allow authorities to draw implications on the spread of the 
disease but not to identify individuals (for the case of Swisscom in Switzerland see Bräuer, 
2020). 
To summarize, responsible innovation is the framework within which governance 
facilitates innovations that avoid harm and do good. These innovations, in turn, contribute to 
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sustainable development. In the following, we will therefore make the distinction between 
responsible innovation as the meta-framework on one hand and organizational innovations 
that avoid harm/do good as the outcomes of responsible governance on the other. These 
organizational outcomes are novel behaviors, processes, products, and services (Thompson, 
1965) that contribute positively to the welfare of society and the well-being of the planet 
while reducing the harmful consequences of social and economic exchange (see Figure 1).  
------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------------ 
 Consequently, transforming governance and institutions at all levels so that they serve 
the goals of sustainable development and provide remedies for the problems that the grand 
challenges pose is essential for responsible innovation (Cagnin et al., 2012; Nilsson, 2017; 
United Nations, 2015). This transformation has to take place at the level of global 
governance, the level of national governance, and the level of corporate governance, which is 
the focus of our paper. The aim of transforming governance structures is clear: The process of 
innovation should not be optimized primarily for the sake of business interests and corporate 
financial growth, but to address the grand challenges, promote sustainability, and serve the 
public interest (Nilsson, 2017).  
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR RESPONSIBLE INNOVATION 
In capitalist societies the decision-making processes of corporations are influenced and 
conditioned by the logic of wealth maximization, which is deeply embedded in the economic 
and legal institutions (Williamson, 1985) and in the corporate governance structures of 
businesses (Jensen & Meckling, 1975). However, it is unclear whether the incentive 
mechanisms in capitalist societies support or impede innovations that contribute to sustainable 
development and whether, how, and on what level governance structures should be reformed 
(e.g., with regard to green innovations see the debate between Marcus & Fremeth, 2009, and 
Siegel, 2009). The literature on corporate governance and corporate responsibility documents 
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various approaches to this question (e.g., Aguilera & Jackson, 2010; Claessens & Yurtoglu, 
2012; Filatotchev & Nakajima, 2014). In the following, we will briefly examine the 
contributions and limitations of these approaches, focusing on evaluating their capacity to 
facilitate innovations that avoid harm and do good. Our central question is this: How and 
under what conditions can the internal governance structures of business firms facilitate 
innovations that address the grand challenges we have outlined, contribute to the well-being 
of society, and are conducive to sustainable development?  
In this conceptual paper we will draw on three dimensions—legitimacy, effectiveness, 
and efficiency—to answer this question and to evaluate the role of corporate governance in 
responsible innovation. These three dimensions are widely used in the political governance 
literature to analyze the effects of alternative governance mechanisms with regard to whether 
the results are socially accepted, meet collective goals, and use appropriate means (Folke, 
Hahn, Olsson, & Norberg, 2005; Fung, 2006; Sorensen & Torfing, 2009; Swyngedouw, 
2006). The dimensions thereby also mirror key aspects of what we have defined as 
responsible innovation—that is, the acceptability, sustainability, and feasibility of the 
innovation process and its outcomes.  
In the public realm, governance can be understood as the steering mechanism by 
which social systems manage their public affairs and generate and implement collective 
decisions to enhance societal well-being (Folke et al., 2005; Jordan, 2008). Corporate 
governance describes the steering mechanisms that corporations use to manage their private 
affairs and to generate and oversee corporate decisions that meet the expectations of the 
constituencies of the corporation (Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2012). To what end private 
corporations should be managed, what interests should be taken into account, and how 
conflicts should be resolved is a matter of debate: Some argue that businesses should focus 
exclusively on the shareholders’ interests (e.g., Jensen, 2002; Sundaram & Inkpen, 2004); 
others suggest that businesses should integrate the concerns of various stakeholders (Aguilera 
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& Jackson, 2003; Cadbury, 2003; Mitchell, Weaver, Agle, Bailey, & Carlson, 2016) or 
demand that businesses focus directly on societal well-being (Ulrich, 2008). The normative 
position of our paper is clear: Corporate governance should influence the corporate innovation 
process so that the outcomes are socially acceptable (legitimacy), meet sustainable 
development goals (effectiveness), and use appropriate means (efficiency) so that the 
resulting innovations avoid harm and do good to society and the planet.  
The capitalist conception of society is characterized by the clear separation of roles 
(Friedman, 1970; Jensen, 2002; Sundaram & Inkpen, 2004): The political and the legal 
systems generate and enforce legitimate legal frameworks that put restrictions on economic 
actors to ensure that the results of their profit-oriented behavior contribute to the well-being of 
society. Within these legal frameworks, corporations focus on their efficiency without the 
obligation to take on any social or political responsibilities (Friedman, 1970). This idea of 
how capitalist societies function is still widely accepted as a role model for profit-oriented 
businesses and, thus, the majority of economic actors.  
From this perspective, innovation, whether it concerns products or processes, can have 
only one aim: to protect or enhance the competitive advantage of firms in order to maximize 
their profits. However, when the behavior of corporations has a negative impact on society 
and state institutions are unable or unwilling to regulate businesses or compensate 
externalities—that is, to bear the costs of the negative societal side effects of doing 
business—via the legal system, the assumption that the responsibilities of businesses are 
entirely separate from societal well-being becomes untenable (Palazzo & Scherer, 2006; 
Scherer & Palazzo, 2007). As these institutional failures have become the rule rather than the 
exception, it is no longer justifiable for private businesses to focus exclusively on efficiency, 
profit, and the interests of shareholders (Bénabou & Tirole, 2010; Stone, 1975). 
Consequently, corporations adjust their role (Matten & Crane, 2005): They provide public 
goods, address externalities, and thus become public actors, subject to the principles of 
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democratic governance and responsible toward society (Scherer & Palazzo, 2011; Ulrich, 
2008). This also has an effect on the role of innovation, whose purpose can no longer be 
aimed exclusively at protecting the competitive position of a firm but must increasingly 
comprise direct contributions to societal well-being (Voegtlin & Scherer, 2017).  
In a globalized world the capitalist conception becomes even more questionable, as 
significant parts of global value chains have been shifted to “fragile states”2 that have 
deficient governance institutions and lack the willingness and capacity to protect the interest 
of their citizens and the intactness of the planet (Fund for Peace, 2019; Naudé, Santos-
Paulino, & McGillivray, 2011). In some economically significant yet oppressive and 
undemocratic countries, workers and citizens who claim their rights, journalists and 
politicians who oppose the government, and scientists and social activists who criticize 
economic or environmental policy or human rights conditions not only risk suppression, such 
as being silenced or fired, but also more repressive measures, such as imprisonment, forced 
disappearance, and murder.  
Today many business operations take place in such countries where there is limited 
democratic control and rule of law.3 This becomes evident in the extent to which fragile states 
export merchandise and commodities (see the number of fragile states listed in the “top 30 
                                                        
2 The Fund for Peace and the journal Foreign Policy publish the annual Fragile States Index in which 
currently 178 countries are assessed on 12 social, economic, political, and military indicators (see https:// 
fragilestatesindex.org/) and are positioned on a scale ranging from “very sustainable” to “very high alert.” 
In 2019, 119 out of 178 nation states were listed in the categories “warning,” “elevated warning,” “high warning,” “alert,” “high alert,” or “very high alert,” and could thus be considered fragile states. By 
comparison, only 59 states were listed as “stable” or better (Fund for Peace, 2019, pp. 6–7). 
3 Multinational corporations operate in heterogeneous institutional environments that include failed and 
weak states, strong but oppressive states, and a large variety of more or less democratic rule-of-law states 
(Scherer, 2018; Scherer, Palazzo, & Seidl, 2013). At the same time, many “fragile states” that lack 
democratic and rule-of-law institutions (Fund for Peace, 2019; Naud´e et al., 2011) are economically 
potent and are thus listed among the preferred host economies of foreign direct investment inflows (see 
UNCTAD World Investment Report, 2019, where PR China, Brazil, India, Mexico, Indonesia, Israel, 
Vietnam, the Russian Federation, and Colombia are listed among the top 20 host economies of foreign 
direct investment inflows and are at the same time listed in the “warning” category or in a worse category 
in the 2019 Fragile States Index report) or important merchandise export nations (see the WTO 
World Trade Statistical Review, 2019, where PR China, Mexico, the Russian Federation, India, Saudi 
Arabia, Thailand, Malaysia, Vietnam, Brazil, and Indonesia are listed among the top 30 merchandise export 
nations and are at the same time listed in the “warning” category or in a worse category in the Fragile 
States Index report of 2019). 
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merchandise export nations” in the World Trade Organization’s World Trade Statistical 
Review, 2019, p. 100) or have become the preferred locations for foreign direct investments 
(see the number of fragile states listed in the “top 20 host economies of foreign direct 
investment inflows” in the UNCTAD World Investment Report, 2019, p. 4). Under these 
conditions humankind cannot wait for fragile states to eventually become reformed and 
democratic. Rather, business firms (and other nonstate actors) have to step in and fill the gaps 
to protect people and the planet (Kolk & Lenfant, 2015; Scherer, 2018; Scherer & Palazzo, 
2011).  
In light of state failures, corporations, among other private and civil society actors and 
transnational organizations, have the important role of generating and diffusing innovations 
that contribute to sustainable development. Consequently, we will evaluate current 
approaches to corporate governance and address three questions relating to the 
aforementioned dimensions of legitimacy, effectiveness, and efficiency.  
Our first question is this: Which structures of corporate governance help businesses 
maintain the legitimacy of innovations? Legitimacy concerns the ethical dimension of 
governance and is defined as (rationally motivated) social acceptance (Suchman, 1995). In a 
general sense, “legitimacy … prescribes the process by which … collective decisions can be 
morally justified to those who are bound by them” (Thompson, 2008, p. 502). Suchman 
(1995) distinguished three sources of social acceptance: perception of benefit (pragmatic 
legitimacy), compliance with taken-for-granted expectations (cognitive legitimacy), and 
explicit moral discourse (moral legitimacy). To answer the first question, we have to examine 
the extent to which changes in corporate behavior, processes, products, and services are 
socially acceptable or can be made socially acceptable.  
The second question we will address is this: Which structures of corporate governance 
help businesses enhance the effectiveness of innovations? Effectiveness is defined as “doing 
the right things” (Rämö, 2002, p. 572, with reference to Drucker, 1974; for a discussion on 
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the effectiveness of corporate governance, see Aguilera, Filatotchev, Gospel, & Jackson, 
2008). This definition reflects the political dimension of governance and puts the focus on 
defining the collective goals toward which corporations should aim their innovations and 
business strategies: “Networking with stakeholders in the identification and use of common 
means will tend to increase efficiency, and networking with stakeholders in the pursuit of 
common ends will tend to enhance effectiveness” (Sorensen & Torfing, 2009, pp. 239–240). 
When answering the second question, we have to consider the goals of corporate innovation 
and explore how businesses should determine their priorities with regard to profitability and 
sustainability (such as the 17 Sustainable Development Goals of the United Nations; United 
Nations, 2015).  
Our third and final question is this: Which structures of corporate governance help 
businesses increase the efficiency of corporate innovations? Efficiency relates to the economic 
or technical dimension of corporate governance and can be defined as “doing things right” 
(Rämö, 2002, p. 572, with reference to Drucker, 1974). To answer the third question, we need 
to investigate how businesses can develop the best measures to efficiently achieve the goals 
and targets previously defined. The processes through which businesses manage these tasks 
generally rely on the principles of economic rationality, which determine the best means for 
given ends. However, as research in decision science has shown (e.g., Mintzberg & Westley, 
2001; Rittel & Webber, 1973), linear decision-making processes, which involve defining the 
goals first and only then selecting the means by which to achieve them, are not feasible in 
conditions of high complexity. In such cases the order may be reversed, so that goals are 
determined according to available means. Furthermore, the processes of goal definition and 
means selection may run in parallel or be interlinked and may involve several actors. 
Therefore, we have to discuss how governance structures can facilitate these processes and 
increase efficiency for the sake of sustainable development and societal well-being (Folke et 
al., 2005). 
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In the next section, we analyze prevalent corporate governance approaches alongside 
the three dimensions of legitimacy, effectiveness, and efficiency.  
 
THREE APPROACHES TO CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:  
CONTRIBUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS FOR RESPONSIBLE INNOVATION 
In the literature on corporate governance, monolithic approaches that focus on capital 
interest compete with more inclusive approaches that take into account a broader range of 
stakeholders (Aguilera & Jackson, 2010; Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2012; Hambrick, Werder, & 
Zajac, 2008). Three broad perspectives contribute to the debate on corporate governance and 
its implications for corporate responsibilities: (1) the shareholder value approach, (2) the 
stakeholder approach, and (3) the political CSR approach. Table 1 presents an overview of the 
assumptions made by these approaches and their contributions and limitations with regard to 
responsible innovation. The extant literature on corporate governance contains many other 
approaches that build on behavioral, institutional, or economic perspectives; focus on various 
levels of analysis; and are either more inward looking, emphasizing the structural or 
behavioral aspects, or more outward looking, exploring the institutional aspects (Hambrick et 
al., 2008).  
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------------ 
Important in this respect are the behavioral corporate governance approach, which 
explores the influence of formal and informal incentives and power structures on individual 
behavior (Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998); the comparative approach, which examines the 
varieties of capitalist institutions and their implications for corporate governance (Hall & 
Soskice, 2001; Whitley, 1999); and the actor-centered corporate governance approach, which 
establishes a link between these levels of analysis (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; Westphal & 
Zajac, 2013). The three perspectives we focus on are orthogonal to this debate and signify in 
 16 
an ideal-typical way extreme positions with regard to the inclusion or exclusion of various 
stakeholders, how value conflicts between stakeholders are resolved, and how corporate 
decisions reflect effects on societal well-being and the protection of the planet.  
The Shareholder Value Approach to Corporate Governance 
The shareholder value approach focuses on protecting the interests of the owners of 
the firm (Bebchuk & Weisbach, 2010; Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and on “the ways in which 
suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment” 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1997, p. 787; emphasis in the original omitted here). Whereas all other 
stakeholders are protected by contracts and regulations, the owners of the firm are considered 
to be the residual claimants (Sundaraman & Inkpen, 2004). The assumption underlying this 
approach is that corporate behavior focuses on rent seeking, while “perfect government” 
(Besley & Ghatak, 2007, p. 1660) involves defining and enforcing regulations that restrict 
corporate behavior and, at the same time, foster the development of corporate innovations that 
contribute to the public interest and do not harm society. According to the shareholder value 
approach, pursuing innovation for sustainable development is not the responsibility of 
businesses: Their sole responsibility is to make profit, and any innovation is subject to this 
goal (Friedman, 1970). Even recent studies espousing the creating shared value approach do 
not depart from this perspective (Porter & Kramer, 2011). These too suggest or imply that 
social and environmental concerns have no intrinsic value and matter only to the extent that 
they influence financial performance (see, critically, Crane, Palazzo, Spence, & Matten, 
2014).  
Consequently, we propose that the shareholder value model of corporate governance 
can be a very powerful means within the framework of responsible innovation if government 
provides the right incentives to foster innovations that avoid harm and, at the same time, do 
good (e.g., if it provides subsidies for investments in environmentally friendly technologies or 
tightens regulations on working conditions, etc.), and if firms are allowed to reap the financial 
 17 
benefits from their innovations (e.g., by protecting ownership rights through patents, etc.). 
However, these conditions are difficult to achieve in a globalized environment, as we will 
illustrate in the following.  
With regard to the three dimensions we discuss in this paper—legitimacy, 
effectiveness, and efficiency—the shareholder value approach to corporate governance is 
limited. The shareholder value approach rests on the assumption that corporations can and 
should focus on making profit because governments can, by and large, adequately regulate 
corporate activities to ensure that the public interest is served (Sundaram & Inkpen, 2004). 
However, in practice, even when companies operate within and comply with a regulatory 
system, this does not suffice to demonstrate their legitimacy. This is because companies often 
do business under conditions of state failure (Bénabour & Tirole, 2010; Scherer & Palazzo, 
2007; Stone, 1975) or in fragile states (Fund for Peace, 2019; Kolk & Lenfant, 2015; Scherer 
& Palazzo, 2011); in both cases the state is unable or unwilling to define and enforce 
regulations that channel the value-generating strategies of business firms toward societal well-
being and sustainable development. Therefore, to demonstrate legitimacy, companies have to 
either adapt their behavior to the expectations of their critics or engage in moral discourse 
with those who are negatively affected by their behavior (Scherer, Palazzo, & Seidl, 2013; 
Suchman, 1995). 
The effectiveness of the shareholder governance model is also questionable where 
sustainable development is concerned. If effectiveness is understood as “doing the right 
things” (Rämö, 2002, p. 572, with reference to Drucker, 1974), it means generating and 
diffusing innovations that contribute to the welfare of (and do not harm) society. This 
understanding of effectiveness highlights two problems with the shareholder value model. 
First, because national law and regulations have a very limited impact outside a country’s 
national borders, both the incentives for firms operating globally to pursue innovation that 
promotes sustainability and the disincentives in the form of sanctions against such businesses 
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whose activities harm society are also limited. Second, the corporate decision-making process 
focuses exclusively on the interests of shareholders. Consequently, external stakeholders 
whose interests lie in promoting social or environmental welfare are normally excluded from 
corporate decisions. As a result, corporate innovations will primarily serve the financial 
interests of shareholders and only secondarily the interests of society, but only if these happen 
to increase corporate profits (see, e.g., Porter & Kramer, 2011; Siegel, 2009). 
With regard to the efficiency of the shareholder governance model, the question is 
whether this model leads to innovations that help achieve predefined goals. The shareholder 
value governance model puts great emphasis on enhancing profits and cutting costs to create 
shareholder value. The idea is that businesses should install incentives and control systems 
that motivate managers to select strategies that maximize shareholder value (Jensen & 
Murphy, 1990). One problem with this approach is that when corporate goals conflict with the 
goals of sustainable development, efficiency essentially translates into putting in place 
measures that, in terms of sustainability or societal well-being, serve the wrong goals. A 
further potential problem is that the simple models of incentives this approach advocates 
prove inefficient in settings characterized by high complexity and ambiguity because their 
consequences cannot be accurately predicted (Kerr, 1975). 
In fact, the widespread pay-for-performance systems have come under scrutiny not 
only because they raise many questions regarding fairness but also because of their negative 
side effects (Frey & Osterloh, 2005). There is evidence that such schemes may discourage 
intrinsic motivation (Deci, Koestner, & Ryan, 1999; Frey & Jegen, 2001), impede innovation 
(Kohn, 1993), and undermine prosocial behavior (Benabou & Tirole, 2006; Fuster & Meier, 
2010), all of which are important for responsible innovation. 
The Stakeholder Approach to Corporate Governance 
The stakeholder approach rejects the narrow view of the shareholder approach (Blair, 
1995; Driver & Thompson, 2002; Lazonik & O’Sullivan, 2000; Letza, Sun, & Kirkbride, 
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2004). Rather than focusing primarily on the interests of the owners of the firm, the 
stakeholder approach acknowledges the interests of a wide range of stakeholders who are 
affected by or can affect the course a firm pursues (Freeman, 1984). The stakeholder approach 
to corporate governance proposes that business firms should allow nonshareholding 
stakeholders to contribute to corporate decisions. Rather than focusing exclusively on profits, 
the management ought to assume the role of moderator and balance the various (possibly 
incompatible) concerns and interests of different stakeholders within and outside the firm, and 
then define a course of action that satisfies the interests of all stakeholders (Blair & Stout, 
1999, 2001; Cadbury, 2003). This is an important contribution toward developing an 
alternative to the shareholder value approach.  
The stakeholder approach is especially powerful in contributing to responsible 
innovation when those stakeholders who take an interest in societal welfare and sustainable 
development are integrated in corporate decision-making procedures (e.g., as an advisory 
panel to the board of directors or when socially responsible investors can hold large blocks of 
shares). However, this often depends on the attributes of stakeholders. We will illustrate the 
limitations of the stakeholder approach alongside the dimensions of legitimacy, effectiveness, 
and efficiency.  
The stakeholder approach considers legitimacy to be an important factor in defining 
the strategic course of the firm (Phillips, 2003). Yet this is either based on the normative 
premise that all stakeholders should be included (Donaldson & Preston, 1995) or considered 
from a strategic or instrumental perspective, where firms take into account the expectations of 
stakeholders depending on their power and legitimacy and on the urgency of their demands 
(Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997). In the latter case, this often leads to a prioritization of the 
demands of the most powerful stakeholders; as a consequence, firms are likely to ignore the 
legitimate or urgent concerns of less powerful stakeholders (Agle, Mitchell, & Sonnenfeld, 
1999).  
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In the former case, normative stakeholder theory does not sufficiently take into 
account the heterogeneity of the institutional environment (Pache & Santos, 2010; Waddock, 
2008) and the legal and moral fragmentation (Scherer, 2015; Teubner & Korth, 2012) of the 
global business setting. Countries have very different legal systems and regulations for issues 
such as taxation, the environment, product safety, and workers’ rights (see, e.g., Michaels, 
2009; Young, 2012), and many businesses operate in fragile states where legal institutions 
and the rule of law in general are weak (Fund for Peace, 2019; Kolk & Lenfant, 2015; Scherer 
& Palazzo, 2011). In addition, the considerable pluralism of social norms, values, and 
lifestyles in different cultures means that firms are confronted with the diverse and possibly 
incommensurable moral expectations of various stakeholders (see, e.g., Scherer, 2015). The 
stakeholder approach has yet to propose mechanisms that will allow businesses to integrate 
diverse institutional and moral concerns (see, e.g., Brès, Raufflet, & Boghossian, 2018) to 
secure the legitimacy of responsible innovation.  
When it comes to identifying “the right things to do” (Rämö, 2002, p. 572, with 
reference to Drucker, 1974) and, therefore, to issues of effectiveness, the strategic stakeholder 
approach would, on one hand, imply that firms give priority to sustainability goals only when 
these are put forward by powerful stakeholders. As a result, R&D and innovation strategies 
serve sustainability either when the most powerful stakeholders’ goals promote sustainable 
development or when stakeholders directly push business firms to produce innovations that 
benefit society (Spar & La Mure, 2003). Therefore, the effectiveness of the stakeholder 
approach with regard to sustainability depends on whether stakeholders have both compatible 
goals and sufficient power to influence corporate decisions. On the other hand, the normative 
stakeholder approach still needs to specify in greater detail how to address the goals of 
sustainable development and the grand challenges that impede their realization (Ferraro et al., 
2015; George et al., 2016). 
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In relation to efficiency, from the perspective of both normative and strategic 
stakeholder theory, “doing things right,” and thus promoting the development and diffusion of 
responsible innovations, depends on the knowledge and competence of various stakeholders, 
on their willingness to contribute their assets, and on the availability of a governance 
mechanism that can convert all these factors into social or technological innovations that aid 
sustainable development. 
The Political CSR Approach to Corporate Governance 
The political CSR approach treats business firms as political actors that contribute to 
the production of public goods where governments are unable or unwilling to do so (Matten 
& Crane, 2005; Scherer & Palazzo, 2007, 2011; Scherer, Rasche, Palazzo, & Spicer, 2016). 
Studies that follow the political CSR approach tend to discuss the role of businesses in public 
governance. These studies focus mainly on the macro level of global governance. However, 
there have also been studies on the internal structures and procedures that business firms 
employ in order to fill such gaps in global governance (Baumann-Pauly & Scherer, 2013; 
Scherer et al., 2016). And there have been initial studies on the forms that corporate 
governance could take seen from a political CSR perspective (see Mena & Palazzo, 2012; 
Scherer, Baumann-Pauly, & Schneider, 2013; Schneider & Scherer, 2015). Moreover, studies 
have explored the potential of making corporate governance more democratic (Driver & 
Thompson, 2002; Gomez & Korine, 2008; Parker, 2002).  
The work that tackles these subjects focuses mainly on two areas: the problems of 
legitimacy that corporate intervention in public issues entails (e.g., Parker, 2002) and how 
deliberation in multistakeholder networks and the democratization of corporate governance 
can (at least partly) compensate for institutional deficiencies in a company’s environment 
(e.g., Scherer, Baumann-Pauly, & Schneider, 2013). Despite some emphasis on the 
implications that businesses serving as public actors have for responsible innovation 
(Voegtlin & Scherer, 2017), this approach still needs to be further developed. 
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The advantage the political CSR approach offers with regard to the link between 
corporate governance and responsible innovation is that it provides a mechanism for 
integrating the various stakeholders—not only the powerful ones—and a mode of decision 
making that allows for multiple objectives—not only financial ones—to be taken into 
consideration. More specifically, by building on the foundation of deliberative democracy, it 
can offer corporate governance innovative possibilities for stakeholder integration (e.g., by 
introducing modes of decision making based on mutual agreement rather than just majority 
voting, offering access to stakeholders with legitimate interests by institutionalizing 
stakeholder panels, or by encouraging socially responsible investors to become shareholders). 
We illustrate these advantages but also the current limitations alongside the three dimensions 
of legitimacy, effectiveness, and efficiency below. 
With regard to legitimacy, adherents of the political CSR approach argue that 
corporations cannot rely solely on complying with legal norms and moral expectations, 
because in a globalized world laws and regulations are fragmented (Teubner & Korth, 2012) 
and moral norms are heterogeneous (Palazzo & Scherer, 2006). According to this view, 
corporations have three choices (Scherer, Palazzo, & Seidl, 2013). First, they can follow a 
manipulation strategy; that is, they can develop a legitimacy strategy to manage the 
expectations of their most important stakeholders. Second, they can follow an adaptation 
strategy and selectively adapt their overall business strategy to the expectations of certain 
constituencies. Third, they can pursue a moral argumentation strategy and actively engage in 
discourses on the social acceptability of their business strategies and behaviors in order to 
maintain or repair their legitimacy. All three types of strategies can be used both reactively 
and proactively (Oliver, 1991).  
With regard to effectiveness, proponents of political CSR reject the shareholder value 
model and the exclusive focus on economic performance (Scherer & Palazzo, 2007). They 
instead propose a more balanced approach that integrates economic, social, and 
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environmental goals and multiple criteria for decision making, including efficiency, stability, 
and justice (see, e.g., Marti & Scherer, 2016). From this perspective, “doing the right things” 
(Rämö, 2002, p., 572, with reference to Drucker, 1974) means that corporations should not 
harm society and should contribute directly to societal well-being. Consequently, corporate 
innovation should not be exclusively influenced by financial motives but should, on the 
contrary, address a range of societal problems and serve the public interest (see, e.g., Marti & 
Scherer, 2016). Unlike stakeholder theory, political CSR provides a mechanism that is based 
on deliberation and offers a procedure that helps with prioritizing goals. 
With regard to efficiency—that is, “doing things right” (Rämö, 2002, p. 572, with 
reference to Drucker, 1974)—the political CSR approach suggests that firms need to design 
their governance structures with an eye toward facilitating an organizational learning process 
(Palazzo & Scherer, 2010), the so-called “triple-loop learning” (Argyris, 1977; Tosey, Visser, 
& Saunders, 2012). This means that learning has to take place on three levels: Firms need to 
modify not only (1) the means they employ but also (2) the ends they pursue and (3) the 
governance structures in which their decisions and actions are embedded.  
The policies associated with climate change illustrate the challenges that the triple-
loop approach poses (Levin, Cashore, Bernstein, & Auld, 2012). In stage one, firms focused 
on changing their routines in order to save energy; in stage two, firms changed their policies, 
which led them to revise their emission goals. In both regards, isomorphic pressures could be 
observed that made firms adopt the latest industry standards over time (e.g., Levy & Kolk, 
2002). Finally, in stage three, governments changed both the regulations that govern climate 
change and the way regulations are enacted; in other words, they changed both the discourse 
and the governance structures that relate to the issue of climate change (Gupta, 2016). This 
example also illustrates the potential competitive advantages firms can gain if they follow a 
proactive learning approach with regard to sustainability: Those firms can create first-mover 
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advantages and can preempt governmental regulation (Reid & Toffel, 2009; Tetrault Sirsly & 
Lamertz, 2008).  
While current research on political CSR provides only initial answers with regard to 
the form that a corporate governance model that encourages firms to engage in responsible 
innovation might take (see, e.g., Scherer, Baumann-Pauly, & Schneider, 2013), we consider 
its foundation of deliberative democracy a promising starting point. To address the open 
questions of the political CSR approach, we develop the deliberative conception further and 
turn to the idea of corporate governance as reflexive and participative governance.  
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AS REFLEXIVE AND PARTICIPATIVE 
GOVERNANCE 
In the literature on ecology and environmental policy there are different approaches to 
defining governance structures that facilitate innovation with regard to environmental and 
social issues (Dryzek & Pickering, 2017; Meadowcroft & Steurer, 2013; Reed, 2008). Reed 
(2008) reviewed some of these approaches and derived a list of best practices, emphasizing 
participation, representation, learning, and the integration of local and scientific knowledge. 
Obviously, these approaches build on assumptions similar to those in political CSR. Dryzek 
and Pickering (2017) advanced reflexivity as a key concept of governance (also see Beck, 
1992; Meadowcroft & Steurer, 2013). They defined reflexivity as “the ability of a structure, 
process, or set of ideas to reconfigure itself in response to reflection on its performance” 
(Dryzek & Pickering, 2017, p. 353) and suggested that deliberation is a driver of reflexivity 
and thus enables reflexive governance.  
Deliberation is understood as “debate and discussion aimed at producing reasonable, 
well-informed opinions in which participants are willing to revise preferences in light of 
discussion, new information, and claims made by fellow participants” (Chambers, 2003, p. 
309). This concept, on which political CSR is also founded (Scherer & Palazzo, 2007), has 
been central in the theory of deliberative democracy (Chambers, 2003; Dryzek, 1990; 
 25 
Habermas, 1998, 2001; Thompson, 2008). Whereas traditional liberal models of democratic 
governance focus exclusively on institutionalized forms of politics (e.g., parliaments, parties, 
elections) (Elster, 1986)4, deliberative democracy involves the shaping of public policy in 
discursive processes that take place above and beyond state institutions and involve both state 
and nonstate actors (Fung, 2003a, 2006; Habermas, 1998, 2001; Roberts, 2004). This makes 
deliberative democracy suitable for studying collective decision making in relation to global 
public issues and to the grand challenges (George et al., 2016; Levin et al., 2012), especially 
in cases where fragile states, weak institutions, nonstate actors, and “messy” problems are 
involved (Rittel & Webber, 1973, p. 155; see also Palazzo & Scherer, 2006; Scherer & 
Palazzo, 2007, 2011). And, indeed, deliberative approaches to participative decision making 
have been applied to collective issues such as renewable energy (Fast, 2013), climate change 
(Lidskog & Elander, 2010), land use policy (van den Hove, 2006), international labor 
standards (Fung, 2003b), and palm oil production (Schouten, Leroy, & Glasbergen, 2012). 
The theory of deliberative democracy advances the idea that democratic decision 
making should not be conceived as the mere aggregation of given preferences through the 
institutionalized mechanisms of election, representation, and the counting of votes (rather 
than arguments) (Elster, 1986). Deliberative democracy emphasizes the role of deliberations 
in the process of forming and changing preferences on public issues and explores the variety 
of communicative conditions and mechanisms to determine collective decisions (Habermas, 
                                                        
4 With regard to the word “liberal” we build on the language use in the literature on political 
philosophy that puts emphasis on individual liberty as the main concern of social theory. 
Accordingly, a “liberal” conception of democracy focuses on how and under what conditions 
the given and irreconcilable preferences of individuals can be aggregated into collective 
decisions by way of elections, majority votes, and representations (Elster, 1986; Habermas, 
1998, 2001). This deviates from the commonsense use of the word in the United States where 
“liberal” means “left of center” in political terms. A deliberative conception of democracy by 
contrast puts emphasis on the communicative processes that lead to the formation and 
transformation of individual preferences. It assumes that preferences are not simply “given” 
but are formed by communications in the first place and that they are in principle open for 
contestation, debate, and change.  
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1998, 2001). The assumption is that collective decisions will be improved if they are based on 
reason and argument (instead of the arbitrary exercise of power) and take into account the 
available knowledge and the interests and perspectives of those who are potentially affected 
by the decisions (Thompson, 2008).  
The theory of deliberative democracy can help us further develop the idea of reflexive 
governance and spell out principles for analyzing and changing governance structures on the 
firm level. Table 2 offers an overview of the elements of reflexive and participative corporate 
governance that will be elaborated in the following section. 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------------ 
Challenges of Reflexive Governance 
If reflexive governance is to foster innovation in a legitimate, effective, and efficient 
way, it has to deal with at least three challenges (Dryzek & Pickering, 2017): participation 
and expertise, diversity and consensus, and polycentricity and centralization. 
Participation and expertise. Reflexive governance requires two inputs of equal 
importance that are potentially in conflict with each other: Civic participation makes sure that 
governance takes into account the interests and perspectives of different societal actors and 
makes use of diverse knowledge bases when addressing collective problems (Meadowcraft & 
Steurer, 2013). This applies especially to economic and societal developments when members 
of society in political processes of collective will-formation develop new public policies or 
point to the harmful consequences and side effects of previous policies (Beck, 1992). 
Complex problems and grand challenges, such as climate change or pandemics, in turn, 
require the knowledge and insights of experts who are capable of identifying the problems, 
their causes, and potential mechanisms to ameliorate them (Reid et al., 2010). However, 
members of society or officials in the administrative or political system may consider 
themselves competent without taking into consideration the insights of experts from science, 
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such as by emphasizing their personal experience and downplaying the role of scientific 
evidence (Dryzek & Pickering, 2017). This effect can be amplified by the official 
communication of the government (with regard to climate change and the energy policy of the 
Trump administration in the United States, see McGuire, 2017; concerning the neglect of the 
emerging COVID-19 pandemic by the Brazilian president Bolsonaro, see Friedman, 2020). In 
turn, experts focusing on technocratic rationality tend to emphasize the efficiency of means 
while leaving aside public policy concerns or underestimating tradeoffs between competing 
public goals (Luke, 2011; Marti & Scherer, 2016). Both effects can lead to a shutting down of 
reflexivity (Dryzek & Pickering, 2017) 
Diversity and consensus. The tension between diversity and consensus in governance 
refers to the fact that reflexive governance needs to be permanently open to new insights and 
multiple perspectives and must be able to question the status quo (i.e., checking the prevailing 
values, practices, structures, and behaviors concerning their legitimacy, effectiveness or 
efficiency). At the same time, governance should not remain in a state of permanent 
reflection. Rather, collective response requires that decisions be made and that reflections 
give way to action (Voß, Kemp, & Bauknecht, 2006). Therefore, public policy as much as 
business policy and strategy have to be made under conditions of conflicting interests and 
goals, time pressure, and incomplete information, often without the possibility to come to a 
consensus. The tension is also reflected in the management literature when organizations 
oscillate between exploration and exploitation (March, 1991) or between innovation and 
routine (Andriopoulos & Lewis, 2009). This tension cannot be resolved. Rather, it appears to 
be a paradox that has to be handled by carefully balancing the options for taking action, 
applying mechanisms such as precautionary principles, organizational slack and slack 
resources, or robust action (Beck, 1992; Ferraro, Ezion, Gehman, 2015; Smith & Lewis, 
2011).  
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Polycentricity and centralization. The tension between polycentricity and 
centralization concerns the institutional architecture of governance (Galaz, Crona, Österblom, 
Olsson, & Folke, 2012). Should governance resources be pooled in one center, which may 
facilitate the exchange of information, internal coordination, and effective diffusion and 
implementation? Or should the resources be decentralized and dispersed over different 
locations and governance layers so there is a higher probability that something useful might 
be created or discovered and applied by way of experiment somewhere at the periphery? The 
latter may be particularly useful for exploring new approaches: “Reflexivity may arise 
through the ability of individuals and groups to organize sites for innovation and 
experimentation that are partly insulated from external pressures to conform and compete” 
(Dryzek & Pickering, 2017, p. 357). However, decentralization may be an obstacle for the 
diffusion of ideas and solutions, compared to centralized systems where innovations such as 
structural or behavioral changes are delegated down the chain of command. This is also a 
problem in the advent of the current COVID-19 pandemic, where the supply of intensive care 
capacities and the demand for those are distributed unevenly and the matching of available 
slack resources with severely sick patients has to be coordinated across different levels of 
local, national, and international governance by way of negotiation and discourse as no 
central steering unit is available. Yet decentralized health care systems, such as in Germany, 
may have some advantages concerning the agility, response time, and availability of slack 
resources to fight new infectious diseases (Kuras, 2020; Oltermann, 2020). 
These tensions are problems that governance needs to address. Introducing 
deliberative structures into governance, including corporate governance, can help to achieve a 
balance (Dryzek & Pickering, 2017). With regard to the tension between participation and 
expertise, deliberation can ensure the inclusion of a broad base of potentially affected 
stakeholders and the technocratic knowledge of external experts required for responsible 
innovation. With regard to diversity and consensus, it allows for both reflection on desired 
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goals with stakeholders and a striving for collective action to achieve those goals. With regard 
to polycentricity and centralization, deliberation is a way to allow for polycentric emergence 
of innovative ideas in an otherwise hierarchical organizational structure. Next we identify 
core aspects for the realization of reflexive and participative corporate governance based on 
deliberative structures. 
Participation in Governance 
Research on deliberative democracy has identified various forms of participation that 
present a continuum between the extremes of the tensions faced by reflexive governance. 
Fung (2006) discussed three key dimensions of participation in governance (for alternative 
typologies see Reed, 2008, pp. 2018–2020) that will help us answer the questions of (1) who 
participates, (2) how participants communicate with each other and make decisions, and (3) 
how these decisions gain authority and earn the status of collectively binding decisions. These 
dimensions define the possible space in which participation in governance can take place. The 
actual form of participation will depend on the issue that needs to be governed, the constraints 
with regard to time and resources, and the individual and organizational capacity for 
deliberation of the relevant actors (Irvin & Stansbury, 2004).  
 With regard to the question of who participates, Fung (2006) distinguished among 
various mechanisms for selecting the actors who participate in governance and envisaged 
participation as a continuum ranging from more inclusive to more exclusive forms of 
participation, including self-selection, which means that anyone who wishes to take part in 
deliberation can do so, and selective recruitment, which aims to include individuals who are 
normally excluded either due to structural or motivational constraints; this can be either active 
or passive (i.e., by means of structural incentives). Participation can comprise lay 
stakeholders (nonexpert individuals who have a deep interest in the matter) or professional 
stakeholders (paid representatives of organized interests). 
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With regard to how participants communicate with one another and make decisions, 
Fung (2006) differentiated among six main modes of engagement, ordered from the least to 
the most intense. In the first three modes, participants are included in communication, but 
they are largely excluded from decision making: They (1) remain passive and simply receive 
information, (2) express their preferences, or have the opportunity to (3) explore, develop, or 
transform their preferences. In the next two modes, individual participants have a greater 
influence on collective decision making: In processes of (4) aggregation and bargaining, the 
conscious preferences of the participants are aggregated into a collective choice; this is often 
influenced by the participants’ power resources. In processes of (5) deliberation and 
negotiation, the collective decision is based on argumentative interaction. This means that 
participants try to form joint preferences and to base their collective choices on reasons, 
arguments, and principles on which (ideally) all can agree. The final mode is (6) technical 
expertise, whereby experts, who are “officials whose training and professional specialization 
suits them to solving particular problems” (Fung, 2006, p. 69), define public policies and 
choices.  
With regard to the impact of participation and how the participants’ decisions are 
connected to action, Fung (2006) emphasized the role of authority and influence. The 
participants in processes of deliberation have various degrees of authority, and this determines 
the degree of influence they have on public policy through the exercise of direct power. 
Participants with the least authority engage in the deliberation of public issues for personal 
benefit and do not expect to influence collective decisions to any substantial degree. In the 
most direct form of participatory decision making, the participants exercise direct authority, 
which means that their decisions automatically become binding collective rules, as is the case 
with referenda. Between these, one can also find influence in the form of providing advice or 
engaging in co-governing partnerships, where participants and officials jointly define the 
goals of policies. 
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Reflexive Governance in the COVID-19 Pandemic Crisis 
Recent challenges such as the COVID-19 (aka “novel coronavirus”) pandemic crisis 
highlights the need for responsible innovation in governance at a significantly more complex 
and integrated level than we are currently practicing (Taylor, 2020). Tragically, in a crisis like 
this, waiting for sufficient data to make crucial public health management decisions would 
potentially cost too many lives (Fottrell, 2020). Therefore, many countries worldwide have 
rapidly and massively responded to the pandemic with emergency measures focusing on the 
demand side of health care.. To flatten the curve of exponentially increasing COVID-19 
infections, governments have instituted information campaigns and intensive testing; enforced 
social distancing and quarantining; tracked infection chains; and closed borders, put 
restrictions on travelling, and instituted nationwide shutdowns of economic and social life–not 
to mention the accompanying of gigantic financial aid programs required to support such 
policies. Hence, to accelerate effective responses to this unprecedented challenge, various 
societal actors have innovated “on the go” – and the key factor in this new development is 
deliberative collaboration and the pooling of resources (i.e., assets, material, knowledge)to 
strengthen the supply side of health care to prepare for the rising tide of COVID-19 patients in 
serious condition.  
Such collaborations can be horizontal or cross-sectoral, i.e., between private, public and 
civil society actors, aiming at rapidly enlarging the capacity of the health care system. Examples 
include mobilizing civil and military reserves, producing urgently needed ventilators or 
protective clothing and masks, developing and testing new diagnostic and therapeutic measures, 
or providing software applications for detecting the movements and social relationships of 
individuals for monitoring the spread of the disease or to warn about potentially affected contact 
persons. In Germany, a number of textile firms have reorganized their operations to produce 
protective clothing and masks that were formerly outsourced to countries such as China or India 
(EDANA, 2020). Furthermore, proving once more that necessity is the mother of invention, 
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several business firms have developed new diagnosis procedures that can quickly detect a new 
coronavirus infection or allow for large-scale testing (Rauwald & Loh, 2020; Roche, 2020). In 
some countries, such as Switzerland, consortia of software hackers and private firms collaborate 
in developing smartphone Apps that help control the spread of the disease but are compliant 
with privacy rights (Betschon, 2020).  
However, vertical collaborations are also needed, e.g., between the local, state, national 
and international levels of governance, to produce structural and procedural innovations that 
enable healthcare systems to respond rapidly to vital needs. The nature of this pandemic is 
characterized by infection cases that erupt in clusters and are not equally distributed within a 
nation. This means that suddenly depleted resources in some areas need to be augmented by 
complementary means secured from other areas: For example, to alleviate some of the pressure 
on regional parts of the French and Italian healthcare system, a number of intensive care patients 
have been transported from France or Italy to hospitals in Germany and Switzerland (Bateman, 
2020).   
These efforts to cope with a new global problem, whose nature we are still seeking to 
grasp, are not just about innovating to avoid harm and do good but also about creating effective 
governance systems that make agile and reflexive responses possible. Despite optimistic 
assessments of crisis response capabilities–for example, for countries such as the United States, 
the United Kingdom and the Netherlands (Cameron et al., 2019) –the current crisis reveals that 
public health care systems are still inadequate in anticipating rapid-response resources and 
establishing cross-sector and cross-border governance collaborations to communicate and 
deploy these resources effectively. Therefore, responsible innovation frameworks should 
enable us to account for post-normal innovation, or innovation produced by post-normal science 
– which is characterized by uncertainty, contested values, high stakes, and the need for urgent 
decisions (Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1990). They should also enable us to observe, understand, 
explain, and show how our governance structures are changing, with new forms of governance 
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and new ways of social and economic life emerging out of necessity (Baker, 2020). Such swift 
changes in governance can also be problematic, as citizens may see their individual freedom 
curtailed by the introduction of new regulations– e.g., legislation that allows detection of the 
location of persons via their mobile phones (Fussell, 2020) or for government to rule by decree 
instead of submitting to parliament for democratic scrutiny of new regulations (Hopkins, 2020). 
We highlight in the following what reflexive governance implies for corporations, thereby also 
reflecting back on responsible (corporate) innovation in light of COVID-19.  
 
CAPACITIES FOR REFLEXIVE AND PARTICIPATIVE CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE:  
TOWARD FUTURE RESEARCH AND PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS 
Corporate governance can be adapted to provide a company with the capacities that 
allow for reflexivity and drawing on various forms of participation. Such innovative elements 
of corporate governance can be introduced in various areas. We focus on six core corporate 
governance areas: ownership structure, accountability of management, legal statute of the 
corporation, stakeholder participation, modes of decision making, and resource allocation (see 
summary in Table 3). Next we discuss these in more detail and provide questions that could 
guide future research.  
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 3 about here 
------------------------------------ 
Ownership or Shareholders Structure  
The ownership or shareholders structure could be adapted to reflect ownership that is based 
on long-term focused investors with social interests. Such impact investing is becoming more 
prominent, and investors see revenue opportunities therein (Dumas & Louche, 2016; 
Höchstädter & Scheck, 2015). Changing the ownership structure in that way would foster the 
involvement of investors with a focus on “doing good,” and the focus on long-term 
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investments would require planning for sustainable development. It should therefore lead to 
increased reflexivity among shareholders and between shareholders and management about 
the goals of innovation and its contribution to sustainable development. Future research could 
investigate the link between governance structures that make long-term investing mandatory 
(e.g., holding shares for at least three or five years) and require a certain percentage of shares 
to be held by socially responsible investors and responsible innovation. 
Accountability of Management 
One possibility to ensure the accountability of management toward broader societal 
interests could be monitoring and, finally, rewarding the firm’s impact on society alongside 
the triple bottom line of economic, social, and environmental performance (Elkington, 1998). 
This could be achieved by introducing mandatory reporting on social and environmental 
performance. While voluntary CSR reporting is already widespread, at least among 
multinational corporations (see, e.g., the number of companies submitting CSR reports 
according to the standard of the Global Reporting Initiative5), and governmental regulation 
especially in Europe makes it increasingly mandatory, a truly integrated reporting combining 
all three performance dimensions is still rare. Moreover, there exists no requirement to 
measure social and environmental impacts. However, measuring the impacts would show the 
extent to which the company contributes to sustainable development.  
Many of the key performance indicators of CSR reports reflect the problems posed by 
grand societal challenges. Reporting also creates transparency and thereby invites stakeholder 
dialogue on future directions of the corporation, and thus its innovations. It would be 
interesting to investigate whether integrated reporting that requires reporting on real numbers 
of a firm’s social and environmental impact would increase stakeholder participation and, 
ultimately, help to secure the legitimacy for innovation. Future research could also investigate 
                                                        
5 www.globalreporting.org 
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the links between the remuneration of top management that is tied to the triple-bottom-line 
performance of the firm, managerial reflexivity, and responsible innovation.  
Legal Statute of the Corporation 
From the concepts of the “profit with purpose” and  the “purpose-driven” corporation, 
legal statutes that tie the corporation to a social purpose have begun to emerge (Hiller, 2013; 
Levillain, Segrestin, & Filatotchev, 2017). It began in the United States with benefit 
corporation statutes in a number of states but diversified into various legal statutes, and now 
other countries are considering the introduction of similar forms as well, among them France, 
the United Kingdom, and Brazil (Levillain et al., 2017). Purpose-driven corporations are a 
specific form of for-profit social enterprise that through the legal statute allows managers to 
dedicate organizational resources to the purpose without compromising their fiduciary duty to 
shareholders.  
It would be interesting to see how far these companies that make managers 
accountable not only for economic prosperity but also for achieving a social purpose redirect 
investments toward innovations that specifically do good, and thus ultimately contribute to 
mitigating grand challenges. Moreover, future research could try to examine the challenges 
that managers in these companies face and the conditions under which these companies 
facilitate innovations that avoid harm and do good most effectively and efficiently. Especially 
promising would be research on purpose-driven corporations and their innovations in 
countries that newly introduce these legal statutes.  
Stakeholder Participation 
Stakeholder participation could be guaranteed in various ways, accounting also for the 
tension between the involvement of expertise in generating ideas and broad societal support to 
facilitate idea implementation. More recent models of corporate governance based on 
stakeholder involvement and stewardship have been put forward (Filatotchev & Nakajima, 
2014; Scherer, Baumann-Pauly, & Schneider, 2013). According to such models, corporations 
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can, for instance, appoint outside directors or include stakeholders in the composition of the 
board of directors to open corporate governance to external opinions. Scherer, Baumann-
Pauly, and Schneider (2013) cited the example of Lafarge, a French-based multinational 
producer of building materials, where the leadership decided to institutionalize its stakeholder 
relations by forming a stakeholder panel.6 This panel became part of the company’s official 
corporate governance. It consisted of ten “critical friends” (Scherer, Baumann-Pauly, & 
Schneider, 2013, p. 500) of Lafarge and met biannually with the executive committee and the 
CEO. Preparatory meetings with the World Wildlife Federation (WWF) took place 
throughout the year. Such stakeholder involvement could increase the reflexivity on 
innovations early on in the process and help to make the innovation process more responsible. 
In this regard, future research could evaluate how far stakeholder involvement that provides 
access to experts in social and environmental questions can foster such reflexivity on the 
goals and means of innovation and its contribution to sustainable development. 
To secure the social acceptance of innovation, and thereby minimize harm, a broader-
based societal discourse would be required, especially in the implementation phase of 
innovation. Stilgoe et al. (2013) suggested a number of techniques for stakeholder inclusion to 
secure the acceptance of innovation; among these are citizens’ juries and panels, focus 
groups, and deliberative mapping or polling, but also the possibility of involving stakeholders 
early on through open innovation. Their framework for responsible innovation was applied to 
a large geoengineering project in the United Kingdom that tested new technology with the 
aim of investigating “whether the purposeful injection of large quantities of particles into the 
stratosphere could … provide a possible means to mitigate global warming” (Stilgoe et al., 
2013, p. 1574). Cuppen and colleagues (Cuppen, 2012; Cuppen, Breukers, Hisschemöller, & 
Bergsma, 2010) proposed a methodology to select stakeholders based on the diversity of 
                                                        
6 In the meantime Lafarge was taken over by the Holcim corporation, and the original Lafarge stakeholder 
panel no longer exists. 
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perspectives to ensure a constructive conflict in the Netherlands around energy options from 
biomass; constructive conflict “refers to an open exploration and evaluation of competing 
ideas and knowledge claims in order to achieve new ideas, insights and options for problem 
solving” (Cuppen, 2012, p. 26). Future research could investigate additional cases with 
varying approaches for stakeholder inclusion and their relation to the social acceptance of 
innovation and addressing grand challenges. 
Modes of Decision Making  
With regard to modes of decision making, voting could be geared toward consensus 
and agreement rather than majority voting when making decisions about investments in R&D 
and innovation. Ideally, this would also include the participation of relevant stakeholders in 
the strategic decision making of the firm. An example of employee inclusion is the German 
Mitbestimmung (codetermination), which is mandatory by legal rules for corporations with 
more than 2000 employees and operates on various decision levels (Addison & Schnabel, 
2011): A representative of the employees is a member of the board of directors, while as 
many as half of the members of the supervisory board are delegated by the unions or worker 
representations. In addition, workers’ councils are also included in various decision-making 
processes at the operational level of the firm. This seems an essential requirement for 
reflexive and participative governance and  could guarantee a debate about the goals of 
innovation, as well as facilitating its social acceptance.  
Research on deliberation has explored the conditions under which participation in 
decision making leads to positive effects with regard to defining goals and facilitating 
acceptance (Delli Carpini, Cook, & Jacobs, 2004; Ryfe, 2005). Therefore, we suggest 
building on this research and encourage qualitative and quantitative empirical research to 
determine the conditions under which a system of codetermination by stakeholders can 
positively influence corporate innovations to avoid harm, do good, and contribute to 
sustainable development. For a positive effect of codetermination on innovation, see Kraft, 
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Stank, and Dewenter (2011); there is even evidence for a positive effect of worker 
representation on firm value (see Fauver & Fuerst, 2006).  
In addition, we deem it relevant to study cases in which the codetermination did not 
help to prevent corporate fraud or address sustainability goals, as in the recent Volkswagen 
diesel scandal (Rhodes, 2016). We need to explore the shortcomings of this particular 
governance model, which in this case seems to have facilitated a collusion of interests among 
shareholders, management, workers, and state representatives. Obviously, in the VW case, 
codetermination did not include representatives of the environment or those most severely 
affected by the emissions. However, it included representatives of the state of Lower Saxonia, 
which owns 25% of Volkswagen shares. Future research could analyze the case in more 
detail, focusing for instance on the ambivalent role of government as shareholder.  
Cooperatives provide organizational forms of codetermination that have been proven 
successful. British firm John Lewis is such a success story, where “Partners [i.e., employees] 
are legally empowered by the JLP Constitution to participate in a range of fora and media, 
which includes the Partnership Council, elected predominantly (80%) by Partners, that is 
formally empowered to remove the Chairman and Chief Executive” (Paranque & Willmott, 
2014, p. 605). In France and Italy, cooperatives have become more popular in recent years 
(Corcoran & Wilson, 2010).  
More radical examples from Germany include “democratized” corporations (Dilk & 
Littger, 2016). One example is the company Allsafe Jungfalk, specialized in securing cargo 
loads, which has already won the top prize as best employer four times (Dilk & Littger, 
2016). The company, for instance, allows its employees to vote on who is to take the lead. 
Another example is consulting firm Dark Horse, which established rules for meetings meant 
to facilitate agreement among participants. Decisions are made according to two principles: 
First, everyone is encouraged to voice her or his opinion; second, if there is no critical 
objection to a proposal and no counterproposal is offered, the suggestion is accepted (Dilk & 
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Littger, 2016). Again, we suggest that it requires empirical research to determine under which 
conditions which mode of decision making is most conducive to the goals of responsible 
innovation.  
Resource Allocation 
Finally, resources could be allocated by the organization to bottom-up socially 
innovative, entrepreneurial projects that specifically address grand challenges and contribute 
to sustainable development. The Boston Consulting Group (Beal, Dahl, Eisenmann, Nowack, 
& Uekermann, 2017) listed current examples of multinational corporations supporting social 
entrepreneurship, among them a start-up that is a collaboration between Danone and the 
Grameen Bank called Grameen Danone. Its aim is to fight “child malnutrition in rural 
Bangladesh by producing fortified yogurt and distributing it to impoverished families through 
a network of ‘Grameen ladies’” (Beal et al., 2017, pp. 2-3). BCG came to the conclusion that 
“Danone has benefited from leveraging its global R&D function to support innovation within 
the social business” (Beal et al., 2017, p. 3). Providing such resources can facilitate 
polycentric structures for responsible innovations that contribute to sustainable development 
within an organization while maintaining a centralized strategy for R&D. 
Resource allocation decisions for responsible innovation also comprise investing 
resources in collaborations with actors beyond the firm’s boundaries. As a case in point, 
research could study innovative responses to the COVID-19 pandemic involving 
collaborations between business firms and other actors, investigating for instance whether and 
how much reflexive corporate governance structures enable horizontal (business as part of 
cross-sector solutions) and vertical (from local to global) collaboration. Deliberative 
capacities can create slack resources for such innovations, e.g., through previously established 
stakeholder relations, intersections with the public sector and sensitivity to social acceptability 
of innovation, especially when contributing to the provision of public goods like health care. 
Deliberative governance creates the preconditions for perceiving potential trade-offs between 
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the legitimacy, efficiency, and effectiveness of innovative solutions (as is often the case in 
responses to the COVID-19 pandemic), because deliberation creates the necessary sensitivity 
to stakeholder rights and related legitimacy questions, and enables the search for innovative 
solutions that try to take all three aspects into account; for example, as in the case of solutions 
relying on anonymous tracking of individuals to control the spread of the disease (Betschon, 
2020). 
Apart from researching specific aspects of reflexive and participative corporate 
governance, we propose that future research should also look more generally at the 
institutional environment, especially at the interplay between governmental regulation and 
corporate governance in responsible innovation. A useful approach could be the framework 
on varieties of institutional systems (Fainshmidt, Judge, Aguilera, & Smith, 2018) because, 
compared to other approaches that study institutional differences (e.g., the varieties of 
capitalism or the national business systems approaches; see Hall & Soskice, 2001; Whitley, 
1999), it more specifically considers the role the state plays in the institutional environment 
and identifies institutional differences in countries that have been understudied to date 
(Fainshmidt et al., 2018). This might be promising for researching the effects of institutional 
differences on generating responsible innovation, especially when investigating cases in 
Africa, Asia, and Latin America. In general, we encourage future empirical research to 
investigate under what conditions which form or aspect of governance is conducive to 
producing innovations that avoid harm and do good and how this contributes to mitigating 
grand challenges.  
CONCLUSION 
Responsible governance involves establishing institutions, structures, and procedures 
on multiple levels to help resolve the grand challenges we have outlined by facilitating 
innovations that do not harm and, ideally, benefit society. We have argued that active 
participation in governance is key to ensuring the legitimacy, effectiveness, and efficiency of 
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the processes and practices this involves. Stakeholder participation has both normative and 
pragmatic benefits for businesses and for society as a whole (see, e.g., Dryzek & Pickering, 
2017; Reed, 2008; Zammuto, 1984). Stakeholder participation in corporate governance, as a 
special type of governance, is normatively justified because it prevents the marginalization of 
certain groups and interests, facilitates the inclusion of those who are affected by political and 
economic decisions, increases trust, and empowers stakeholders to become active co-creators 
and to contribute their knowledge. Participation in governance is also pragmatically justified 
because it enhances the quality of the decisions that are made—decisions that rely on a 
broader knowledge base and range of perspectives and that take into account local 
sociocultural and environmental conditions tend to be better informed and balanced. 
A key question with regard to participation is this: How and to what extent can or 
should stakeholders participate in governance, and on what level? General principles such as 
everyone should participate in matters of public concern are too abstract to serve as useful 
guidance (Fung, 2006). There are limits to participation based on individual, structural, and 
economic barriers: (1) Not everyone is willing and able to participate in collective decision 
making; (2) participation may be largely impeded by institutional obstacles, such as in fragile 
states that lack democratic institutions and actively exclude citizens from taking part in 
collective decisions; and (3) the cost of participation, deliberation, and consensus-building 
can be considerable and overstretch the available resources of corporations and of society as a 
whole (Irvin & Stansbury, 2004; Kleinman, Delborne, & Anderson, 2011; Sherlock, Kirk, & 
Reeves, 2004). 
Complex systems respond to these obstacles by making simultaneous use of multiple 
coordination mechanisms, such as markets, hierarchies, administration, and public 
deliberation. Additionally, they rely on representation and political or technical expertise to 
unburden their members of the task of engaging with any issue of public concern (Habermas, 
1984). These coordination mechanisms cannot be replaced entirely by civic participation and 
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deliberation. Instead, participation and deliberation should be treated as a necessary 
complement to the other coordination mechanisms. That means that we consider regulation by 
democratically elected governments still to be the most legitimate, effective, and efficient 
route to responsible innovation. However, there will often be a time lag between the discovery 
of harmful consequences of innovations and a regulatory response, and companies can avoid 
national regulation by relocating their value-creating activities to fragile states outside the 
reach of the democratic rule of law (note that almost two thirds of the world’s states can be 
considered fragile; Fund for Peace, 2019). Therefore, we regard corporate governance as a 
necessary (but not the only) complement to governmental regulation.  
The challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic raise the question of how to engage 
with the paradox that deliberative decisions often need to be made faster in an increasingly 
complex environment, whereas this complexity would require more time for adequate and 
socially legitimate decision making, because it requires actors to search for more information, 
engageme with potentially more stakeholders, weigh more complex facts, etc. One aspect 
future research might want to look into is the slack resources created by reflexive and 
participative governance structures that might be able to mitigate some of these challenges 
and might lead to better decisions also in the short run than decisions by nondeliberative or 
autocratic governance bodies.  
 We have discussed the limitations of prevailing corporate governance approaches 
with regard to innovations that address the grand challenges humanity is facing. To address 
these limitations, we have built on and extended the political CSR approach and argued that 
corporate governance requires reflexivity with regard to the tensions posed by responsible 
innovation—that is, business organizations need to be able to oscillate between participation 
and expertise, diversity and consensus, and polycentricity and centralization. Structures that 
allow for reflexivity and participation can help firms to acquire the capacities to do so and to 
produce legitimate, effective, and efficient innovations. Moreover, they allow firms to choose 
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the relevant mode of engagement with stakeholders. The engagement of stakeholders through 
reflexive governance structures can help to define and achieve a consensus on the right goals 
for business innovation, provide the technical expertise to choose the most efficient means for 
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TABLE 2. Corporate Governance Infused With Elements of Deliberative Democracy 
  
Implications for corporate governance Relationship to responsible 
innovation 
Challenges of reflexive 
and participative 
governance (or, the 
limitations of 
deliberation) 
Corporate governance needs to make sure 
firms can find a balance between:  
 Participation and expertise 
 Diversity and consensus 
 Polycentricity and centralization 
 
Ways to overcome the 
challenges: 
  
Relying on various modes 
of participation 
Corporate governance opens up for different 
degrees of stakeholder participation 
 
Expertise allows for idea generation; 
broad-based stakeholder inclusion 
allows for idea implementation 
Building capacity for 
reflexivity 
Corporate governance creates individual 
and structural conditions for reflexivity by 
including individuals with various 
perspectives and provides arenas for open 
discourse 
Allows managers to draw on the 
potential for deliberation to deliberate 
with stakeholders about the goals 
(effectiveness), means (efficiency) and 









Future research could investigate what happens 
when corporate governance … 
Why we expect that this relates to reflexivity and 
participation:  
Why we consider this conducive to responsible 
innovation: 
Ownership structure Makes shareholding with long-term focus mandatory 
 
Ensures that a percentage of shares is held by socially 
responsible investors 
 
Increases the reflexivity of owners because they 
need to consider long-term development 
 
Ensures participation of shareholders with an interest 
in sustainable development 
 
Shareholders can help to determine the focus on the 




Creates accountability toward society through 
integrated reporting 
 
Provides incentives for managers to contribute to 
triple-bottom-line performance 
 
Encourages dialogue with external stakeholders who 
assess the reports 
 
Creates possibilities for reflection by considering 
multiple performance objectives 
Provides necessary reflection on the goals 
(effectiveness) and means (efficiency) of the firm’s 
innovation strategy 
Legal statute Adopts legal statutes that are emerging in several 
countries and ties the corporation to a social purpose 
Increases managerial reflexivity about the 
corporation’s purpose and the goals of its innovation 
processes.  
Legally obliges managers to dedicate resources to 
foster the corporation’s social purpose and thus to 
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Allows for direct participation of stakeholders and 
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secure social acceptance 
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(effectiveness) and means (efficiency) of the firm’s 
innovation strategy and can contribute to innovative 
ideas 
 
Secures social acceptance (legitimacy) of innovation 
as the voices of those who are potentially affected 
are heard 
  
Modes of  
decision making 
Bases decision making on open discourse aimed at 
consensus among stakeholders when making decisions 
about investing in R&D and innovation 
 
Increases participation through various forms of 
involvement of stakeholders in the decision-making 
process 
 
Secures social acceptance (legitimacy) of innovation 
as everyone supports the decision 
Resource allocation Provides (financial) resources for supporting new 
social ventures within the corporation and in 
collaboration with external partners 
Encourages bottom-up participation of employees in 
responsible innovation processes and facilitates 
exchanges with entrepreneurial ventures  
Allows for polycentric emergence of responsible 
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